Articles on mutual funds

Saint Jack On The Attack 

John Bogle thinks the mutual fund industry has betrayed investors. That makes him mad.
Justin Fox
 
01/20/2003
Fortune Magazine
Time Inc.

John Bogle is without question a titan of our age. He founded the investor-owned, ultra-cost-conscious Vanguard Group and built it into the second-largest mutual fund company in the land. He pioneered index mutual funds and was a leading force behind the triumph of no-load investing. He has written bestselling books of investment advice. His opinions are regularly sought by journalists and elected officials. He even spawned an army of "Bogleheads," small investors from around the country who communicate their admiration for the man on Internet message boards and gather for occasional jamborees.

But pay a visit to Bogle at Vanguard's sprawling headquarters outside Philadelphia, and the picture you see is not that of capitalist icon in repose. For one thing there's his office, just off the legal department and one floor down from the executive suite where he once reigned but is no longer really welcome. With its stacks of books and papers his office looks far more professorial than CEOish. There's also Bogle's less than grand choice of lunch venue--the Vanguard cafeteria--where, in deference to his transplanted heart, he sticks to the salad bar. Then there's the man's almost teenager-like enthusiasm about the people he gets to meet: Warren Buffett said something nice about him to Eliot Spitzer! He got to sit next to Paul Krugman at a dinner! As for Bogle's outfit of bright-yellow sweater and green-and-blue-plaid pants, well, let's just chalk it up to casual Friday and leave it at that.

What's most incongruous about Bogle, though, is how he spends his time. At 73, with a spectacular record of success behind him, with a pre-owned heart beating in his chest, he crunches data and churns out op-ed pieces, speeches, and journal articles ripping into the business he has spent his entire adult life building. "A lot of things have changed in this business, and we've moved in the wrong direction," Bogle says as he prepares to launch into a tirade he's polishing for a couple of mid-January speeches in Boston. "Let me count the ways."

So he does. First, Bogle says, fund managers now trade in and out of stocks way too much. "We used to be in the business of long-term investing, and now we're in the business of short-term speculation." Average annual portfolio turnover at equity mutual funds is more than 100% now, up from the mid-teens back when Bogle was starting in the business in the 1950s. High turnover, Bogle believes, is a recipe for high costs and disappointing long-term performance.

Second, "We've moved to making fund choice extremely difficult," he says. "Back then there were probably 200 funds, and now there are 5,000 equity funds, give or take." Instead of big diversified funds that offer investors a cheap, relatively safe entree into the market, the industry has come to focus on risky specialized funds that tend to get great returns for a few years and then crash.

Third, most funds are now run not by investment committees but by individual managers who are marketed to investors as "stars." Grumbles Bogle: "They're not stars but comets." And in fact, the tendency of fund managers to underperform market averages like the S&P 500 has only grown more pronounced over the decades.

Finally, and most dismayingly, the fees that mutual fund companies charge their investors have risen steadily, from an industry average of about 0.75% of assets each year back in the 1950s to almost 1.6% now. (Vanguard, as the accompanying chart shows, has been the great exception, with costs dropping steadily over the years.)

As a result, Bogle argues, investors in mutual funds have been almost criminally misserved. Encouraged by the industry's marketing techniques, investors now tend to hop in and out of funds. The average fund holding period has dropped from 16 years in the 1950s to 2 1/2 years now. And investors have done a pretty horrendous job of timing those hops. From 1984 through the end of 2001, when the S&P 500 advanced at a compound annual rate of 14.5% and the average equity mutual fund rose 11.5%, actual fund investors made just 4.2% a year, according to financial research firm Dalbar. Given how tough 2002 was for the market, the average investor return since 1984 will probably drop below 3%. That's less than the inflation rate over that time. Which means that over the past 18 years, the average mutual fund investor has gone nowhere, or maybe even a little bit backward.

"Other than that, this is a great industry," Bogle cracks.

The facts Bogle cites are, as he himself puts it, "irrefutable and undeniable." But despite the crisis of confidence that the fund industry is facing these days--with more money being pulled out of equity mutual funds than is flowing in for the first time in 14 years--nobody other than Bogle is really addressing them. After years of arguing with the man they sometimes sarcastically dub " Saint Jack ," the rest of the fund industry has decided that the best policy is to ignore him. The current leaders of the Investment Company Institute declined to comment for this article. So did Jack Brennan, Bogle's successor at Vanguard. In fact, Bogle and Brennan have barely spoken since Bogle's reluctant departure from Vanguard's board when he hit the mandatory retirement age of 70 in 1999. (Vanguard does, however, continue to fund the Bogle Financial Markets Research Center, which consists of Bogle, an assistant, and a secretary.) The last time Vanguard's founder was invited to speak at an ICI event was in 1990, when another fund executive referred to him in a speech as not just a communist but a Bolshevik. Bogle responded that most of the people who worked for him considered him a fascist.

Bolshevik, communist, and fascist are all a bit strong. But when it comes to how mutual funds should be run, Bogle isn't exactly a capitalist either. His biggest complaint about the fund business, it turns out, is that it's run like a business--one that tries to maximize returns to its shareholders rather than to its customers.

Bogle traces this behavior back to a 1956 federal court ruling that allowed the firms that manage mutual funds to be bought, sold, or taken public. (The SEC had previously banned such sales.) "That opened the door to looking at this business as an entrepreneurial business, in which the focus was on making money for the entrepreneurs," he says. "That explains a lot. Once you change the investment profession into the financial services business, you put management in the back seat and marketing in front." Bogle ought to know. He was on the front lines of the transformation that he now bemoans.

Upon graduating from Princeton in 1951, the Montclair, N.J., native got a job--on the strength of his senior economics thesis about the mutual fund business, which we'll discuss later--at the Wellington Fund in Philadelphia. Founded in 1928, Wellington was the first balanced fund, one which mixed stocks and bonds. That conservative approach enabled Wellington to survive the 1929 Crash and the dismal 1930s. In the prosperous 1950s, though, it was starting to seem out-of-date.

Bogle rose quickly through the ranks at Wellington not as a money manager but as a marketer and administrator. By the late 1950s, he was the heir apparent to founder Walter Morgan. As he saw Wellington falling behind more aggressive rivals, he began pushing for change. At Bogle's urging, Wellington launched a second fund, the all- equity Windsor fund, which didn't take off until after the hiring of now legendary manager John Neff in 1964. Wellington Management Co. went public in 1960. More funds followed.

In the go-go 1960s that still didn't seem like enough, so in 1966 Bogle engineered the headline-making deal that would change everything for him. He merged Wellington with a Boston investment- counseling firm that managed the hottest fund of the moment, Ivest. "It was certainly the dumbest move of my career," Bogle says now. "I did something really stupid and paid a very steep price."

By the early 1970s the stock market had stopped go-going, and Bogle and the four young Bostonians who ran Ivest discovered they couldn't stand each other. The Bostonians, it turned out, could do something about it. The merger had given them 40% of Wellington Management's shares to Bogle's 28%, and in 1974 they were able to engineer a board vote to oust him. (Neff was the only dissenter.)

But while Bogle was out at Wellington Management, he was still chairman of the funds Wellington managed. Legally, mutual funds have always been organized as actual mutual enterprises in which the fund shareholders have final say. In reality, fund shareholders tend to be a pretty passive lot, and most funds were--and are--controlled by management companies like Wellington and Fidelity. But the boards of the funds managed by Wellington were still peopled with pre-merger Bogle loyalists, so the ousted CEO decided to stage an unheard-of revolt.

He first urged an outright takeover, in which the funds would simply buy Wellington Management and put him back at the helm. His fellow board members were too timid for that but agreed to a compromise: Wellington Management would keep managing and distributing the funds (distribution consisting of contracting with a sales force of load-charging brokers), while Bogle would handle "administration."

Bogle dubbed his rump organization Vanguard, after Nelson's flagship at the Battle of the Nile--thus keeping with the Napoleonic- wars theme set by "Wellington." And while Vanguard was at first in charge of nothing but keeping records and sending out statements to shareholders, Bogle quickly devised some sneaky ways to extend its reach. He got around the distribution compromise by switching the funds to no-load--selling shares directly without an up-front fee instead of going through the brokers controlled by Wellington. Then, in 1976, came the Vanguard Index Trust, which, because it simply aimed to track the S&P 500, got around the boards' decision to leave money "management" in the hands of Wellington. (Wellington Management is still around and still manages some Vanguard funds. But not many.) "It was one of the great acts of disingenuous opportunism defined by the mind of man," Bogle says now.

Thus was Vanguard, the only major mutual fund company controlled by the shareholders in its mutual funds, born. And thus was John Bogle reborn as a fearless crusader for small investors. If the Bostonians hadn't fired him, it might never have happened. "If I were still running Wellington Management, it wouldn't be no-load, and I would probably be rich as Croesus," Bogle says.

By the standards of the world at large and even those of FORTUNE readers, Bogle is in fact pretty well off. His holdings, built up by pouring his money into Wellington and then Vanguard mutual funds year after year after year, total almost $20 million. By the standards of the investment business, though, that's nothing. Abigail and Ned Johnson of Fidelity Investments, Vanguard's archrival, are worth a reported $10 billion.

That is why, barring another boardroom showdown like that at Wellington in 1974, it is highly unlikely that more mutual fund companies that truly are mutual will follow in Vanguard's wake. There's just not enough money in it. But that's not to say investors can't do a better job of choosing funds. And the way to do that, Bogle says, is to focus on that critical element of cost.

Always a number cruncher, even when he was running Vanguard, Bogle has now published two studies in the Journal of Portfolio Management showing that the lowest-cost quartile of funds consistently outperforms the highest-cost quartile. The margin of outperformance (2.2 percentage points over the ten years ending June 30, 2001) is substantially greater than the difference in costs (1.2 percentage points).

Bogle is happy to reel off the names of fund companies other than Vanguard that already--thanks to low expense ratios, limited fund offerings, low portfolio turnover, and modest advertising budgets-- score high on his "stewardship" meter: Capital Group (which manages the American Funds family), Clipper, Dodge & Cox, Longleaf, TIAA- CREF. If the expense ratio were to replace those one-, three-, and five-year performance numbers as the most watched measure in the fund business, more would surely fall in line.

And then, just maybe, the mutual fund business could fulfill the promise that Bogle sketched out for it in that senior thesis of his back in 1951. Titled "The Economic Role of the Investment Company" and inspired by a December 1949 FORTUNE article on the then little- known mutual fund business, the thesis contained the germ of several ideas that were to become important decades later. (If you're really interested, it can be read in its entirety in the 2001 book Bogle on Investing: The First 50 Years.) The young Bogle observed that "funds can make no claim to superiority over the market averages." He concluded that mutual fund costs were too high. Most of all, though, he sounded hopeful: Mutual fund managers, because they possess "greater knowledge of finance and management than the average stockholder," could exert a healthy controlling influence on corporate behavior, Bogle argued. And citing John Maynard Keynes's depiction of financial markets as dens of irrational speculation, Bogle predicted that the rise of rationally managed, long-term- oriented mutual funds would change all that.

As Bogle puts it now, "Keynes one, Bogle nothing."

But don't count Bogle out. He certainly hasn't given up hope. "Of course there's hope," Bogle says. "There's a guarantee it will get better. People will not act contrary to their own economic interests forever." Now there's something both capitalists and Bolsheviks can agree on.

FEEDBACK jfox@fortunemail.com


Shining a Light on Mutual Fund Managers' Pay

Poor Performance Increases Calls for Public Scrutiny Of Compensation by Funds

By Aaron Lucchetti
 
04/07/2003
The Wall Street Journal
Page R1
(Copyright (c) 2003, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.)

YOUR CONGRESSMAN brings home an annual salary of about $155,000. A major-league baseball player makes about $2.3 million, on average. The CEO of a large public company: $2.8 million, before stock options.

And the mutual-fund manager running your money? That's a mystery.

Amid the bear-market push for corporations and Wall Street to disclose much more about their business practices to investors, the subject of compensation for mutual-fund managers remains a throwback to a quieter era. Fund companies are required to disclose the fees they charge shareholders under Securities and Exchange Commission rules, but they don't need to say anything specifically about how much they pay their talent or even how that pay is determined.

Now there are intensified efforts to change that. Critics, including some in Congress, have stepped up their calls for more information on manager pay. And fund watchers like Morningstar Inc. and interest groups like the AFL-CIO have expressed interest in the subject as well.

One critic is John Montgomery, portfolio manager at Bridgeway Capital Management. In testimony last month to a House financial-services subcommittee, he said that when fund managers invest in individual companies, they "have the right to know" the compensation of the company's leaders. But when investors put money in mutual funds, they're "in the dark," he said.

Mr. Montgomery, 47 years old, is a rarity among fund managers. A former transportation engineer, he founded Bridgeway in 1993, and a few years later started disclosing his salary.

In 2001, it totaled $296,836, including the contributions Bridgeway made to Mr. Montgomery's retirement plan, according to the firm's filings with the SEC. (The filing is available through a link on the firm's Web site -- www.bridgewayfunds.com).

Why does Mr. Montgomery disclose his pay? Bridgeway's fund investors haven't requested the data, and Mr. Montgomery admits that few investors seem to have even noticed it. Instead, he says he considers it "the right thing to do" and adds that it helps his firm differentiate itself from the rest of the $6 trillion fund industry.

Indeed, fund firms in general disclose very little to shareholders about what they pay their managers and about how that pay is structured. "A lot of this information is proprietary," says a spokesman for Fidelity Investments, the largest fund firm by assets. Adds James A.C. Kennedy, head of the equity division at T. Rowe Price Associates: "It seems rather superfluous."

To be sure, fund firms aren't totally silent on how they pay their managers. Large fund firms such as Fidelity, T. Rowe Price, Putnam Investments and Franklin Resources say they base the bulk of their managers' pay on the performance of the funds they run. They usually measure this by comparing the fund's total returns with a benchmark, such as a market index or a group of similar funds. In addition to this "relative" performance, firms often take into account factors such as how much new shareholder money the fund has attracted, the amount of risk a fund takes or the managers' willingness to share their investment ideas with colleagues.

Few mutual-fund firms, however, make specific pay information public by putting it on their Web sites or disclosing it in filings with regulators. Most fund firms only discuss compensation methods and levels privately with the independent trustees on fund boards, who ultimately approve the overall management fees paid to each fund's investment advisory firm.

What industry salary information is available often comes from compensation studies in which the participating firms aren't identified. According to a large survey conducted periodically by the Association for Investment Management and Research and executive-search firm Russell Reynolds Associates, manager pay varies widely based on the size of the mutual-fund company and the seniority of the manager. The typical manager in 2001 -- when stocks were much closer to their peaks -- made about $400,000 for running a U.S. stock fund, with the top 10% of managers making more than $1.5 million.

Raises since then have been few and far between for most stock-fund managers. Alan M. Johnson, managing director of compensation consulting firm Johnson Associates, says the average annual paycheck for stock-fund managers is off 30% to 50% since the 2000 market peak, but the decrease isn't as sharp as seen for other financial-services positions such as investment bankers.

While almost all fund firms are mum on the subject of manager salaries, Bridgeway's approach is vastly different. The closely held Houston firm breaks down its top executives' pay in excruciating detail. Mr. Montgomery's salary, for example, fluctuates based on the investment performance of the five funds he manages versus their benchmarks over the previous one and three years. The rest is determined by measures such as Bridgeway's profitability and customer service.

"I can't come up with a compelling reason why shareholders shouldn't know this," says Mr. Montgomery, who is also Bridgeway's majority owner.

Of course, investors who feel like they are already drowning in information may ask why they really need to know about their manager's compensation. After all, they probably don't know the salaries of a lot of the other people they do business with -- such as their broker, for example.

And people can already find out the total they have to pay in fees for manager salaries and all other expenses when they put money into a fund. The SEC requires fund companies publish this fee in fund prospectuses as a percentage of assets. Regulators also are considering a proposal to expand the required fee disclosure in semiannual shareholder reports.

But financial planners who channel hundreds of millions of dollars into mutual funds say manager pay data would be particularly useful in their research about which funds to recommend to their clients.

"It's an important piece of information" for fund firms to disclose, says Harold Evensky, chairman of Evensky, Brown & Katz, a Coral Gables, Fla., financial advisory firm that oversees $350 million in investor assets. Knowing a fund manager's compensation structure, he says, helps investors better understand how the manager will run the fund.

Fund managers can be paid in a variety of ways, much like a pro athlete. In baseball, a player's total earnings can be tied to hitting more home runs or making fewer errors. Fund managers also can be paid either for big bets or for playing it safe. Some are paid more for making money in any environment, but most are paid for beating a fluctuating benchmark, such as the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index.

Most fund companies see no need to disclose more about how they compensate managers, but the issue has certainly received more scrutiny within fund firms as the bear market has hurt their profits and battered the accounts of fund shareholders. "Very few firms haven't looked at changing their compensation," says Lawrence Lieberman, managing director of Orion Group, a Princeton, N.J., executive-search firm.

A case study in the controversy over manager pay erupted recently at Janus Capital Group Inc., the Denver growth-stock specialist that has seen its assets and profits decline sharply since the stock-market peak. While most Janus stock funds lost money and shareholders in 2002, Janus fund performance relative to similar funds improved, which when added to a restricted stock grant helped boost the firm's compensation last year.

The pay increase irked Highfields Capital Management, an activist Boston hedge fund that in late 2002 and early 2003 accumulated a 9.8% stake in Janus. In December, Highfields urged Janus to reduce its fund managers' pay and to publicly disclose their employment contracts. Janus has declined to disclose, but in a January conference call, Janus Chief Executive Mark Whiston said the firm had hired a consultant to review its compensation.

Janus isn't alone in paying based on relative performance. "It's a broad philosophical question," says George Wilbanks, a managing director at Russell Reynolds. "Is it fair to pay a manager a premium if the investor lost money and the firm's revenues are falling?"

A fee formula based on relative performance also led to an unusual trend recently at the $14.4 billion Fidelity Growth Company Fund. Because this fund topped its investment benchmark, the Russell 3000 Growth Index, during the three years ended Dec. 31, 2002, the fund's performance-linked expense ratio has increased to 1.12% of assets, from 0.87% in 2000.

David Jones, a vice president at Fidelity, says the fund's incentive performance fee "is one fee that people should be happy to pay," since it means that the fund has beaten its target index over the previous three years. The fund's fees are reduced, as required by SEC rules, if the portfolio trails its benchmark.

But some may wonder about the logic of investors paying more for the performance of the fund when it has declined 53% between Dec. 31, 1999, and Dec. 31, 2002. And while the fund was beating the Russell index during that period, it was trailing broader market benchmarks such as the S&P 500.

The fund also has the distinction of being one of the only large stock-fund portfolios that both doubled its net assets from 1998 to 2001, while increasing its fee. Funds usually are able to take advantage of economies of scale to reduce fees as portfolios grow larger, but at the Fidelity fund, the performance fee had a larger impact than the economies of scale.

Mr. Jones defends the performance formula, pointing out that it rewards Fidelity for beating a benchmark, not for simply following market movements out of their control. "Skill should be measured versus a benchmark," he says. "You don't deserve a bonus for just going up with the market, and you don't deserve a penalty for just going down."

One of the oldest and most divisive questions about paying fund managers is this: Should managers be paid more when the funds they manage attract new assets? The practice ties the fund managers' pay more closely with their company's fortunes, but not necessarily with those of current fund shareholders. That is because a manager who pays too much attention to attracting new investors may spend less time researching stock picks that could benefit current shareholders.

If managers are paid according to their fund's performance, there are questions of just how fund firms should measure that performance. Is it before or after taxes, and perhaps more fundamentally, over a short time period or a long one? Many investors demand instant results, but others hold funds for decades, so not all shareholders can really be satisfied on this score.

There is no doubt that greater disclosure is a dominant theme at the SEC these days. In January, the SEC passed a rule requiring funds to disclose how they cast their ballots in corporate-proxy contests, part of an effort to help investors find out whether fund managers have been voting shareholder interests, as they are required to do. The fund industry bitterly fought the proxy rule, calling it an expensive measure that would subject fund companies to political pressure.

The SEC hasn't taken up the manager-pay issue. But after Mr. Montgomery brought it up at the congressional hearing in March, subcommittee Chairman Richard H. Baker sent a letter to new SEC Chairman William Donaldson asking the agency to look into a variety of issues, including whether disclosure of managers' pay formulas and ownership stakes in their own funds would benefit investors.

New disclosure rules for manager pay could be a hot-button issue, though. Some in the industry express doubts that pay information would really help that much. "If someone gets paid a very large amount of money, what does that mean for [fund] shareholders?" asks Richard Lannamann, vice chairman at executive-search firm Spencer Stuart. "Does that mean the management fee is too high" or simply that the fund company has paid top-dollar for a talented stock picker, he says.

Barry Barbash, who used to oversee mutual funds at the SEC and currently is a partner in the Washington office of law firm Shearman & Sterling, says the SEC has looked at the issue of manager pay. But it decided to focus on ways to build investors' awareness about basic concepts like how much they paid in overall fees.

Mr. Barbash also said he wonders how useful it is to compare the salary of a fund manager in an expensive city like New York with one in, say, Columbus, Ohio. Finally, pay disclosure could convince talented fund managers to bolt to hedge funds, where much less is disclosed. Even so, the former regulator says requiring disclosure of manager-pay formulas, as opposed to actual salaries, is "clearly an appropriate endeavor for the SEC to consider."

Other fund watchers agree that formulas would be a smart step. "We don't have to see the levels of compensation, but we think their bonus scheme is relevant," says John Rekenthaler, president of Morningstar's investment adviser unit. And the AFL-CIO will also put manager pay issues on its mutual-fund reform agenda this year, says Michael Garland, who oversees corporate transactions for the labor group.

Fund manager Mr. Montgomery wants the SEC to go further. He says that disclosing the actual salary is the best way to see the structure of pay in action. "If there's any time this is going to happen, it would happen after three years of a bear market," Mr. Montgomery says. "In the '90s, people didn't care about all this stuff. Now people want to look under the hood."

                       Paying Up

  While most fund managers' salaries are secret, a few have to disclose 
pay in filings of their advisory firms. Manager John Montgomery
voluntarily discloses his salary. Pay includes salary and bonus, but
not options.

  Manager: Mario Gabelli
  Largest Fund: Gabelli Asset Fund
  Other Roles: Chairman, CEO, Gabelli Asset Management
  Pay/Year: $47.1 million/2001

  Manager: William Gross
  Largest Fund: Pimco Total Return
  Other Roles: Managing director, Pimco
  Pay/Year: $39.8 million/annually*

  Manager: Robert Kapito
  Largest Fund: BlackRock Muni
  Other Roles: Vice chairman, BlackRock
  Pay/Year: $7.8 million/2002 Income

  Manager: Paul Rissman
  Largest Fund: Alliance Growth & Income
  Other Roles: Director of Growth Equity Research, Alliance Capital
  Pay/Year: $3.8 million/2002

  Manager: Alfred Harrison
  Largest Fund: Alliance Premier Growth
  Other Roles: Head of Large-Cap Growth Equity, Alliance Capital
  Pay/Year: $1.5 million/2002**

  Manager: William Lippman
  Largest Fund: Franklin Balance Sheet Inv
  Other Roles: Senior vice president, Franklin Resources
  Pay/Year: $1.5 million/2002***

  Manager: John Montgomery
  Largest Fund: Bridgeway Aggressive Inv 1
  Other Roles: President, Bridgeway Capital
  Pay/Year: $296,836/2001

   *Salary not included; reflects payment under five-year retention plan
  **Salary not included; reflects unvested award under Alliance
Partners Compensation Plan
 ***Fiscal year

 Sources: SEC filings, companies
  ---
                    Sharing the Pain

  While most fund firms had reduced profits in 2002, not all reduced
compensation from 2001 levels.

                       Change        Change in
 Fund                  in Net        Employee
 Company               Income        Compensation*

Federated Investors    +20.96%       + 2.48%
Eaton Vance**          + 4.34        +15.21
Alliance Capital       - 0.59        - 2.54
T. Rowe Price          - 0.82        - 7.11
Franklin Resources     - 6.57        + 1.66
Janus Capital          -71.98        + 6.01

  *Including restricted stock
 **Fiscal years, figures for 2002
include acquisitions of Fox Asset Management and Atlanta Capital.

  Sources: SEC filings, companies

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