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MIRCEA IOAN MARCU

 

Abstract                                                                                    Given their history of underinvestment in telecommunications, the emergence of new technologies, and the link between infrastructure investment and economic growth, former socialist countries have probably more to gain by investing in communications than in any other utility sector. Yet after more than a decade of adoption, cellular penetration levels vary widely among countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Using a carefully constructed set of instrumental variables, I estimate a logistic model of mobile communications diffusion to examine the determinants of cellular penetration in these countries. I find that digital technology and the introduction of competition increased the speed of diffusion of mobile communications. Countries had to choose whether to award more licenses from the beginning, or delay competition and award digital mobile licenses sequentially. Sequential entry had a greater impact than simultaneous entry, compensating for the delay in the introduction of competition. Larger and richer countries introduced competition earlier, and tended to award more than one digital mobile license initially. Failure to account for this selectivity leads to upward biased estimates of the effect of competition on cellular penetration.

  • "Public Technology Infrastructure, R&D Sourcing, and Research Joint Ventures," with James D. Adams and Andrew Wang (forthcoming in Economics of Innovation and New Technology)   Download                                                                                         

  • Abstract                                                                                        In this paper we define public technology infrastructure to mean public resources that bring new R&D into existence.  Examples are public research that yields knowledge spillovers and government contracts that broker new research.  Using this definition we explore the effect of public infrastructure on cooperative R&D, especially R&D sourcing and Research Joint Ventures (RJVs).  Our findings strongly suggest that public infrastructure promotes cooperative R&D. We begin by studying the role of federal laboratories in R&D sourcing by private laboratories, finding that sourcing increases as a result. Then we examine patents arising from RJVs sponsored by the Advanced Technology Program (ATP).  We find that R&D subsidies as well as difficulty and novelty increase patents produced by the RJVs. Contractual oversight by ATP has no direct effect but an indirect effect appears to exist, since firms value ATP oversight more highly for more difficult and novel projects, and these produce more patents.

 

Abstract                                                                        I develop a two-sided market model of managed care organizations to analyze their pricing and quality decisions. Two-sided markets are markets in which there are two-way externalities between the usual participants in a market, buyers and sellers. The number, quality, health risk, or some other characteristics of members on one side of an intermediary’s network affect the utility of individuals on the other side. I find that insurance premiums, physician reimbursements, and the quality of managed care reflect the indirect externalities enrollees on each side of the market exert on members of the other side. Policy makers should therefore be careful to avoid the fallacies of applying the logic of one-sided markets to managed care.